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THE UNSOLVABILITY  OF THE GODEL  CLASS WITH IDENTITY 
WARREN  D.  GOLDFARB 
The Go5del  class with identity (GCI) is the class of closed, prenex quantificational 
formulas whose  prefixes have  the  form  VV3.  3  and  whose  matrices contain 
arbitrary  predicate  letters  and  the  identity  sign  "=  ", but  do  not  contain  function 
signs  or  individual  constants.  The  VV3  3  class  without  identity  was  shown 
solvable over fifty years ago ([4], [12], [17]); slightly later, that class was shown to 
possess the stronger property of finite controllability ([5], [18]). (A class of formulas 
is solvable iff it is decidable for satisfiability; it is finitely controllable if  every 
satisfiable formula in it has a finite model.) At the end of [5], Gddel claims that the 
finite controllability of the GCI can be shown "by the same method" as he employed 
to show this for the class without identity. This claim has been questioned for nearly 
twenty years;  in ?1 below we give a brief history of investigations into it. The major 
result of this paper shows Gddel to have been mistaken: the GCI is unsolvable. ?2 
contains the basic construction, which yields a satisfiable formula in the GCI that 
lacks finite models. This formula may easily be exploited to encode undecidable 
problems into the GCI. 
The minimal  Godel class with identity (MGCI) is the class of GCI formulas that 
contain one existential quantifier, i.e., the VV3  class with identity. In ?3 the basic 
construction is elaborated to obtain the unsolvability of the MGCI. This settles the 
decision problem for all prefix classes of quantification theory with identity, given 
the following older results: the V]V class is unsolvable, even without identity [11]; 
the 3 ]*  3V  V class and the 3 ...  3V]  3 class with identity  are solvable  ([16],  [1]). 
Thus a prefix  class is unsolvable iff it allows at least two universal quantifiers,  at least 
one of which governs an existential quantifier.  This dividing line differs  from that in 
pure quantification theory, that is, quantification theory without identity. For here 
the 3 .  3VV3  .]3  class  is solvable  (this is an easy  consequence  of  the solvability  of 
the VV3  3 class), so that the minimal unsolvable classes are VVV3  [19] and V3V. 
A class C of formulas is said to be conservative  iff there is an effective mapping p 
from the class of  all quantificational formulas to  C such that, for every F, F is 
satisfiable iff  p(F) is  satisfiable, and  F  is  finitely satisfiable iff  (p(F) is  finitely 
satisfiable.  If C is conservative then the decision problem for C has maximum degree 
of unsolvability;  moreover, C is also undecidable for finite satisfiability,  and the class 
of formulas in C that have finite models is recursively  inseparable from the class of 
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formulas in C that are unsatisfiable [21].  In ?4 the basic construction is further 
refined to show that the MGCI is conservative. Thus for quantification theory with 
identity,  as  for  pure  quantification  theory,  every  unsolvable  prefix  class  is 
conservative. 
In ?5 it is shown that the reduction of ?4 can in fact be carried out with MGCI 
formulas whose  nonlogical  vocabulary contains,  aside from monadic  predicate 
letters, only  one  dyadic  predicate letter. Thus  the  class  of  such  formulas  is 
conservative. This result, together with two  easy consequences of  it, settles the 
decision problem for all classes of formulas specified by prefix and similarity type. 
Details are given in ?6. 
?1.  Background. Gddel's claim regarding the GCI seems to have been entirely 
ignored for over thirty years. Through the 1950s, there is no mention of the GCI or 
of the claim in the literature.  In the early 1960s, Burton Dreben began to investigate 
the claim, and could not see how to prove it; Stail  Aanderaa, at that time a student of 
Dreben's,  devised  several  examples  that  exhibited  prima  facie  difficulties in 
extending Gddel's method for the class without identity to the GCI. Dreben wrote to 
Gbdel on  May 24,  1966, asking for substantiation of  the claim and presenting 
Aanderaa's examples. In a letter of July 19, 1966, Gddel replied that he could not 
recall the details, but he did remember  the extension of his method as involving "no 
difficulty".  Throughout the late 1960s, Dreben urged that the decision problem for 
the GCI be deemed open; by the early 1970s this view became widely accepted. 
Also by the early 1970s, the nature of the difficulty with the GCI had been lo- 
cated. Let F be a formula in the GC1, and let W be any model for F. A distinguished 
element of  level 1 is an element of W that is the sole exemplar of some property 
expressible  using  the  predicate  letters  of  F.  For  example,  if  F  implies 
VXVy(ZX  A  Zy  -+  X =  y)  A  3wZw, where Z is a monadic predicate letter, then every 
model  for F  contains  a  unique element of  which  Z  is  true; this  element is  a 
distinguished element of level 1. For k ?  1,  a distinguished  element  of level k +  1  is an 
element of W not among the distinguished elements of levels < k that is the sole 
element bearing some particular relation (expressible using the predicate letters of 
F)  to  the  distinguished  elements  of  levels  < k.  Each  of  the  known  finite 
controllability proofs for the Gddel class without identity, including Gddel's own, 
can be adapted to yield the following: 
If F has a model VI  that, for some k, contains no distinguished elements of 
level k, then F has a finite model. 
This was shown, independently, by Dreben and Goldfarb, by Gurevich, and by 
Schiitte in the early 1970s. A proof can be found in [3, p. 253]. Throughout the 
1970s,  many researchers  sought to show the GCI finitely controllable by providing a 
bound on the levels of distinguished elements that a GCI formula could require. 
However, in 1979 the author showed that no primitive recursive function provides 
such a bound and, consequently, there is no primitive recursive decision procedure 
for the GCI, or even for the MGCI [6]. This made it clear that far more than Gddel's 
method would have to be used for the GCI, if it were to have a positive solution. 
Even so, many of  those concerned with the class  including the author-were UNSOLVABILITY  OF  THE  GODEL  CLASS  WITH  IDENTITY  1239 
inclined to believe that it would turn out to be finitely controllable. In particular,  the 
technique of [6] for obtaining GCI formulas that demand distinguished elements of 
large levels k cannot be extended to yield a GCI formula that demand distinguished 
elements of every level. Moreover, hopes for a positive solution were nourished 
when, in 1980, Gurevich, Shelah, and the author showed a subclass of the MGCI to 
be finitely controllable by a method that does not yield a primitive recursive  decision 
procedure [7]. 
A brief look at the problems encountered in generating distinguished elements 
may help explain this misguided optimism, as well as aid in the understanding of the 
construction of ?2. Imagine that we have shown that in any model W for a GCI 
formula F there are distinguished elements of certain levels  let us call them 0, 
L,...,k  and we wish to  insure the existence of  a unique element that bears a 
relation S to k. This element will then be a distinguished element of the next higher 
level. It is trivial to obtain the existence of at least one element that bears S to k. 
Uniqueness  would  follow  if F could  be made  to imply  VxVyVz(Sxy  A  Szy  -+  X =  Z); 
but since this requires three universal quantifiers, it outstrips the means allowed in 
GCI formulas.  In a sense, the problem is to find a way of using existential quantifiers 
to capture a sufficient amount of the power of a third universal quantifier. 
Now F can be made to imply 
(i)  VxVy[x  #  y  -+  3z(Sxz  A  - 
SyZ)]. 
If we also have 
(ii)  if an element bears S to k then it bears S to nothing else, 
then uniqueness is forthcoming. For suppose a bears S to k and b =#  a. If in (i) x and y 
take the values a and b, then by (ii) the existential variable z must take the value k, 
and we obtain m  Sbk. Thus only a bears S to k. Now (ii) would follow if F could be 
made to imply VxVyVz(Sxy  A  Sxz -+ y =  z), but again this requires three universal 
quantifiers. In  [6],  (ii) is  obtained  by  having  F  imply  something  of  the  form 
VxVy(Sxy -+ 3z( .  )] such that, if x and y take values a and c, where a bears S to c and 
also bears S to k, then the existential  variable  z must take a value among  0,..  ., k -  1; 
and this in turn can be used to force c to be identical with k. However, such a strategy 
works only up to a point: for sufficiently large k, the existential variable cannot be 
required to take a value among the earlier distinguished elements. This limitation 
lent some plausibility to the belief that the GCI is finitely controllable. 
The construction of ?2 rests on a somewhat different  strategy. To obtain (ii), F is 
made to imply a formula VxVy(Sxy -+ 3z( .)]  in which the existential variable does 
not take as value a distinguished element of lower level. In fact, in some models its 
value need not be distinguished at all. However, its value can be required to bear 
certain relations to distinguished elements of lower levels, and this turns out to be 
enough. Further explanation at this point would be uninformative;  let us now turn 
to the construction itself. 
?2.  The basic construction.  The bulk of this section is devoted to the construction 
of a GCI formula F that is satisfiable but has no finite models. As we shall see, once F 
is at hand it will be a simple matter to encode an undecidable problem into the GCI. 
The formula F contains the monadic predicate letter Z and the dyadic letters S, P1, 
P2, Q, N, R1, and R2. F is designed so that, in every model W for F, there will be a 1240  WARREN D.  GOLDFARB 
unique element 0 of which Z is true, a unique element 1 that bears S to 0, a unique 
element 2 that bears S to 1, and so on ad infinitum. Thus Z acts as the predicate "is 
zero", and S as the successor relation. The other letters are used to  insure the 
existence of such 0, 1, 2,...,  and are meant to act as follows. Elements of W can be 
taken to represent pairs of  integers. Suppose b represents <  p, q>; then P1 holds 
between b and the element p, P2  between b and q, Q between b and q +  1, N between b 
and an element that represents <  p +  1,  q>, R1 between b and any element that 
represents <q +  1,  r> for some r, and R2 between b and any element that represents 
<r,  q +  1> for some r. 
Let F be a prenex form of VxVy3zoH, where H is the conjunction of the following 
eleven clauses: 
(1)  Zx  A  Zy  -+  X  =  y, 
(2) ZzO  A m SZOX  A Aa=  1,2  (P5xzO  A  P5xy  -+  y =  Zo) 
(3) 3zSzx, 
(4) -iZx  A  X  =  y  -+  3z(Sxz  A  m  Syz), 
(5) 3z[Nxz  A  (Qxy  -+  Qzy)  A  (Rlxy  -+  R1zy)  A  (R2XY  -+  R2ZY)], 
(6) Nxy  3z(P2xz  A  P2yZ), 
(7) Nxy  3w3u(P1xw  A  Suw  A  PIyu), 
(8) Sxy  3z(Qzx  A  P2Zy  A  PIZZO), 
(9) Qxy  3z(P1xz  A  (Syz  -+  P2XZ)), 
(10)  Aa=1,2  [P5XY A  iZy-  3z3w(Rbzx A  P2ZW  A  PIZZO  A  Syw)], 
(11)  Ab=1,2  [Raxy -+  3z3w(P1xz  A  Swz  A  (P5yw  -+  P2XZ))]. 
LEMMA 1. F is satisfiable. 
PROOF. Let 7r:  N2--+  N  be a bijective pairing function. Interpret the predicate 
letters of F over N as indicated two paragraphs back, where 0, 1, 2,...  are identi- 
fied with 0, 1, 2,...  and an integer k is taken to  represent <p, q> iff k =  7(p,  q). 
These interpretations yield a model for F with universe N.  D 
LEMMA 2. F has no finite models. 
PROOF. Let W be any model for F. We shall find distinct elements 0,  , 2,...  of W 
such that, for each integer p, 
(A) for all c in W,  Zc iff c = 0; 
(B) for all c in W,  Spc iff p > 0 and c = p -  1; 
(C) for all c in W,  if p > 0 and Scp -  1 then c = p; and 
(D) for (  =  1, 2 and all c, b in W, if Pcp and Pcb then b =  p. 
(An expression like "Pacb" is short for "W  I= Pcb".) 
By clauses (1) and (2) of F, there is a unique 0 in W such that ZO.  Since the variable 
zo of F must always take 0 as its value, clause (2) of F yields (B)-(D) for p = 0. 
As induction hypothesis, suppose  0,...,  k  are distinct elements of  W obeying 
(A)-(D) for each p < k. 
SUBLEMMA  1. Let c, d e WI  and suppose Ncd. For each p < k, if  PIcp -  1  then 
P1dp,  and if P2dp  then P~cp. 
PROOF.  Since Ncd, by clause (7) there exist a and b in W with P. ca A Sba A  P1  db.  If 
PIcp -  1, where p <  k, then a =  p -  1 by (D), whence  b =  p by (C). Hence  P1dp. Also, 
by clause (6), there exists e in W such that P2ce  A  P2de. If P2dp, where p < k, then by 
(D) e =  p, so that  P2cp.  D 
SUBLEMMA  2. Let a, b e WI  and suppose Sak and Sab. Then b = k. UNSOLVABILITY  OF THE GODEL CLASS WITH IDENTITY  1241 
PROOF. Since Sab, by clause (8) there exists co in  f with Qcoa  A  P2cob A  P1CO0. 
Iterated use of clause (5) yields the existence of c1,  .  Ck  in % such that Ncici + 1 for 
each i, 0 <  i <  k, and Qcia for each i, 0 < i <  k. Since P1coO,  iterated application of 
Sublemma  1  yields  P lckk.  By  clause  (9),  there  exists  d  in  f  with 
Plckd  A (Sad -+  P2Ckd).  By (D), d = k. Since Sak,  P2ckk.  Iterated application  of 
Sublemma 1 yields P2cok. But P2cob;  by (D), b = k.  D 
SUBLEMMA 3. There is a unique  a in % such that Sak. 
PROOF. By clause (3) there is at least one a in %  with Sak. By (A) and (B),  m Za. Let 
b E %f,  b =#  a. By clause (4) there exists c in % with Sac A  7  Sbc. By Sublemma 2, 
c = k. Thus  -7  Sbk.  D 
Now  let k +  1 be the unique a such that Sak. By (B), k +  1 is distinct from 0, 
1, . .. I  k. 
SUBLEMMA  4. Let 6 =  1 or 2, and let c, b E %. Suppose Peck  +  1 and P~cb.  Then 
b =  k +  1. 
PROOF. By (A) and (D), -  Zb. Hence by clause (10) there exist co, d in %  such that 
R~coc A  P2cod A  P1CO0 A  Sbd.  Iterated  use  of  clause  (5)  yields  the  existence  of 
c1,  . .  ., Ck in % such that Ncici + 1 for each  i, 0 <  i <  k, and R~cic  for each  i, 0 <  i < k. 
Since  P1  co 0, by Sublemma  1 we may  infer P1ckk. By clause  (11) there exist  e, e' in % 
such  that  Plcke  A  Se'e  A  (Pace'  -+  P2cke).  By  (D),  e =  k.  Thus  e' =  k +  1, so  that 
Pace'. Hence  P2Ckk. By  Sublemma  1, P2cok. But  P2cod; hence,  by (D),  d =  k. Thus 
Sbksob=k+  1.  D 
Sublemmas  2-4  show  that  (A)-(D)  hold  for all p <  k +  1. Thus,  by  induction, 
there is an infinite  sequence  of  distinct  elements  of  %.  I 
To obtain  unsolvability,  we exploit  the fact that every model  for F contains  an w)- 
sequence  of  elements  on which  S acts  as the successor  relation. 
THEOREM 1. The Godel class  with identity  is unsolvable. 
PROOF.  Let  J  =  Vx3uVyK(x, u, y)  be  any  V3V-formula  of  pure  quantification 
theory;  there is no loss  of  generality  in supposing  that  the predicate  letters  of J are 
distinct  from those  of F. We construct  a formula  in the GCI  that is satisfiable  just  in 
case  J is satisfiable.  Since  the V3V class  of  pure quantification  theory  is unsolvable, 
this yields  the theorem. 
Herbrand's  theorem  implies  that J is satisfiable  iff there is an interpretation  of its 
predicate  letters  over N such that  K(p,  p +  1, q) is true for all integers  p and q. Now 
let J' be a prenex equivalent  of F  A VxVy3u(Sux  A  K(x, u, y)) that is in the GCI.  If J 
is satisfiable,  then  a model  for J' can  be obtained  by adjoining,  to the model  for F 
given  in the  proof  of  Lemma  1 above,  interpretations  of  the predicate  letters  of  J 
over N such that K(p,  p +  1, q) is true for all p and q. Conversely,  if J' has a model  f, 
then, since J' implies  F, there are distinct  elements  0, 1, 2,...  of % that obey  (A)-(D) 
for each integer p. And then, for all integers  p and q, K(p, p +  1, q) is true in %. Thus 
the restriction  of  % to  {0, 1, 2,...  } is a model  for J.  Z 
?3.  Minimal  Godel class with identity.  The construction  of ?1 may be refined so as 
to  use  only  one  existential  quantifier.  As  before,  every  model  for  the  formula  we 
construct  will contain  elements  0, 1, 2,...  such  that 0 is the unique  element  of which 
Z is true and, for each  k, k +  1 is the unique  element  that  bears  S to k. Additional 
monadic  predicate  letters B1, B2 and dyadic  predicate  letters L1, L2 will be used: B~c 
is to hold  iff P~cO  holds,  and  L~cp is to hold  iff P~cp +  1 holds,  6 =  1, 2. These  new 1242  WARREN  D.  GOLDFARB 
predicate letters enable us to eliminate the nested existential quantifiers used in 
?2. 
Moreover, the elements 0, 1, 2,...  are now going to be distinct from the elements 
that represent pairs. A new monadic predicate letter I will be true of the former 
elements and false of the latter. The last new predicate letter used is monadic D, true 
of an element only if it represents a pair <p, p>. 
Let G =  VxVy3zH,  where H is the conjunction of the following seventeen clauses: 
(1)  Zx  A  Zy-+  X = y, 
(2) Zx  -+ Ix  A  Ai= 1,2  (BAy  PYx), 
(3) Ab=1,2  (Bbx  A  PbXy  -  Zy), 
(4) (Sxy --+  Zx  A  Ix  A  Iy)  A  (L1xy -  Ix  A  7  B1x), 
(5) Dx  -+  (Pxy  =P2xy), 
(6) x  =  y  A  7  ZX  -+  ZZ, 
(7) (Zx  A  Iy -Szy)  A  (Zx  A  7  Iy -  P1  yz), 
(8) Ix  A  7  Zx  A  Iy  A  7  Sxy  A  X =  y -+  Sxz  A  7  Syz, 
(9)  Ab  1,2 (Pbyx  A  7 ZX  -+  SXZ  A  Lbyz), 
(10)  Nxy  P2XZ  A  P2yZ, 
(1 1) Nyx  P1 yz  A  L1xz, 
(12)  Sxy  Qzx  A  P2Zy  A  B1z, 
(13) Qxy  A  7  Dx  -+ Nxz  A  Qzy, 
(14) Qyx  -+  PIyz  A  (SXZ  -+  P2yZ), 
(15)A=1,2(Lbxy  -+  RbZX  A  P2Zy  A  B1z) 
(16)  =  1, 2 (Rbxy  A  -7 Dx -  Nxz  A  Rbzy), 
(17) A =  1,2 (Rbyx  -+ P1  yz  A  (Lbxz -+  P2yz)). 
LEMMA 1. G is satisfiable. 
PROOF.  Let the universe  be N  u  N2, and let 7r,  and 7t2 be the projection  mappings 
on N2. Interpret  the predicate  letters  of  G over the universe  so that, for  5 =  1, 2 and 
all a, b in the  universe:  Za iff a =  0, Ia iff a e N; B~a  iff a e N2  and  7rba  =  0; Da iff 
a e N2  and  7tla  =  7r2a;  Sab  iff a, b e  N  and  a =  b +  1; P~ab iff a e  N2  and  71ba  =  b; 
Lbab iff a  N2  and  nba =  b +  1; Qab iff be  N, b >  0, and a =  <p,b  -  1> for some 
p <  b-1;  Nab iff a =  <p, q> and b =  <p +  1, q> for some  integers  p and q;  R1ab  iff 
a =  <p,q>  and  b =  <q +  1,s>  for  some  integers  p,q,s  with  p <  q; and  R2ab  iff 
a =  < p, q> and  b =  <s, q +  1> for some  integers  p, q, s with  p <  q. These  interpre- 
tations  yield  a model  for  G. Indeed,  define  a two-place  function  (p on  the  universe 
thus: 
0  if a=b=O, 
b +  1  if a=Oandbe-N, 
a-1  if a,be  N, a =0  O,a  =A  b,a  =A  b +  1, 
a  -  1  if a =#  0 and either  Plba  or P2ba, 
p(a,  b)  =  72a  if  Nab, 
7r1b  if Nba,  Qba, R1ba, or R2ba, or if a =  0 and  b e N2, 
<0, b>  if Sab or Llab  or L2ab, 
<Kr1a  +  1, 72a>  if  -  Da and  either  Qab, R1ab, or R2ab, 
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It is a routine matter to check that this is a proper definition (that is, its clauses do not 
conflict) and that y is a Skolem function for the existential variable of G (that is, 
H[a, b, (p(a,  b)] is true for all a and b in the universe under the interpretations of the 
predicate letters given above).  R 
LEMMA  2. G has no finite models. 
PROOF.  Let 91 be any model for G. By clauses (1) and (6) of G, there is a unique 
element 0 of  T  such that ZO.  By clauses (2) and (4), IO  and m  SOc  for each c in A. For 
6 =  1, 2 and any c, b in 91,  clauses (2) and (3) yield (Bc  -PcO)  A (Bc  A  Pcb  -+ Zb); 
hence if PacO  and Pbcb  then b = 0. 
Now suppose O,..  ., k are distinct elements of  f such that, for each p <  k, 
(A) for all c in  ,  Zc  iff c =  0; 
(B) for all c in A,  Spc iff p >  0 and  c =  p -  1; 
(C) for all c in A, if p >  0 and Scp -  1 then c =p; 
(D) for 6 =  1,  2 and all c, b in A,  if Pcp and Pcb then b = p; and 
(E) for all c in A, if p > 0 and L1cp -  1 then Picp. 
SUBLEMMA 1. Let c, d e WI  and suppose Ncb. For each p <  k, if PIcp -  1 then P1dp, 
and if P2dp  then P2cp. 
PROOF. Since Ncd, by clause (11) there exists b in % such that P1cb A  Lldb. If 
P1cp -  1, where p <  k,  then b =  p -1  by (D), so that P1dp by (E). By clause (10) there 
exists e in % such that P2ce A P2de.  If P2dp,  where p <  k, then e = p by (D), so that 
P2cp.  LI 
SUBLEMMA  2. Let a, b e St and suppose Sak and Sab. Then b = k. 
PROOF. Since Sab, by clause (12) there exists co in %  with Qcoa  A  P2cob A  B co. By 
clause (2), P1coO.  Iterated use of clause (13) yields the existence of c  , . . , cj such that 
Ncici  +  1 for each i, 0 <  i < j, and Qcia for each i, 0 <  i < j, and either j =  k or else 
j <  k and Dcj. In the latter case we have P1cjj by iterated use of Sublemma 1; by 
clause (5), then, P2cjj,  so that P2coj by Sublemma 1. But P2cob;  by (D), then, b =j, 
whence a = j +  1 by (C), and this is impossible. Hence ] =  k. Then, by Sublemma 1, 
PIckk.  Since Qcka,  by clause (14) there exists d in % such that Plckd  A  (Sad  -*  P2ckd). 
By (D), d =  k. Since Sak by hypothesis, P2ckk. By Sublemma 1, P2cok. Since P2cob, 
by (D) b =k  D 
SUBLEMMA 3. There is a unique  a in % such that Sak. 
PROOF. By clause (7) there is at least one a in %  with Sak. Now suppose a #  b, Sak, 
and Sbk. By Sublemma 2 and (B), m  Sab. By clause (4), m  Za A Ia  A Ib. Hence, by 
clause (8), there exists c in % such that Sac A  7  Sbc. By Sublemma 2, c = k. Thus 
m  Sbk, contrary to hypothesis.  LI 
Now  let k +  I  be the unique a such that Sak. By (B), k +  1 is distinct from 
O,1,...,k. 
SUBLEMMA 4. Let 5  =  1 or 2, and let c, b E St. Suppose Lack and Lbcb.  Then b = k. 
PROOF. Since L~cb,  by clause (15) there exists co in %  with Rbcoc A P2cob A  B1co. 
By clause (2), P1coO.  Iterated use of clause (16) yields the existence of c1,. .  ., c; such 
that Ncici+ 1 for 0 < i < j, Rbcic  for 0 <  i < j, and either  = k or else  < k and Dci. 
By reasoning as in the proof of Sublemma 2, we may infer that the latter case is 
impossible; hence j =  k. By Sublemma 1, P1ckk. Since RbCkC,  by clause (17) there 
exists d in  9I such that  PlCkd  A (Lbcd  -  P2Ckd).  By (D),  d = k.  Since Lack by 
hypothesis, P2ckk. By Sublemma 1, P2cok. Since P2cob, by (D) b = k.  LI 1244  WARREN D.  GOLDFARB 
SUBLEMMA 5. Let 6 =  1 or 2, and let c, b E St. Suppose Pbck  +  1 and P~cb.  Then 
b =  k +  1. 
PROOF. Since  m  Zk +  1, by clause (2)  m  B~c,  so that m  Zb. Two uses of clause (9) 
yield the existence of  d and e  in  W with  Sk +  ld  A Lacd and Sbe A Lace. By 
Sublemma  2, d =  k; by Sublemma  4, then,  e =  k. Since  Sbk, b =  k +  1.  D 
SUBLEMMA  6. Let c E 9t and suppose Llck.  Then Plck  +  1. 
PROOF. By  clause  (4), m  Ic  A  -  B1  C. By  clause  (7) there  exists  b in  W such  that 
P1  cb;  by  clause  (2),  -  Zb.  Hence,  by  clause  (9)  there  exists  d  in  W  such  that 
Sbd A Q1cd.  By Sublemma 4, d = k. Hence b = k +  1, so that Plck  +  1.  D 
Sublemmas  2-6  show  that  the  induction  hypotheses  (A)-(E)  hold  for  each 
p <  k +  1. By induction,  then,  there  is an infinite  sequence  of  distinct  elements  of 
THEOREM  2. The minimal  G5del class with identity is unsolvable. 
PROOF. Let  J  =  Vx~uVyK(x,u,y) be  a formula  in  the  V]V-class  of  pure  quan- 
tification  theory,  whose  predicate  letters  are  distinct  from  those  in  G. Let  J'  be 
obtained  from  G by conjoining  the following  two  additional  clauses  to the matrix: 
(18)Ix  A  -IZx  A  Ay A  -ISXY  A  X  #y-K(z,x,y), 
(19) Syx -+ K(x, y, y)  A K(x, y, x). 
It suffices  to  show  that  J' is satisfiable  iff J is satisfiable. 
Suppose  J is satisfiable.  To  the interpretations  of  the predicate  letters  of  G over 
the universe  N  u  N2  given  in the  proof  of  Lemma  1, adjoin  interpretations  of  the 
predicate  letters of J over N that make K(p,  p +  1, q) true for all p and q. Since, for all 
a and b in the universe,  Sab is true iff a, b E N and a =  b +  1, (19) is true for all values 
of x and y. If the antecedent  of (18) is true for values  a and b of x and y, then a, b E N, 
a  >  0, and, by clause (8), z takes the value a -  1. Hence  the consequent  of (18) is true. 
Thus  we have  obtained  a model  for J'. 
Suppose  J'  is  satisfiable;  let  W  be  a  model  for  it.  Since  J'  implies  G, there  are 
elements  0, 1, 2, ...  of W that obey (A)-(E)  for every integer p. By (B) and clause (4), Ip 
for each  p. Now  for  all integers  p and  q such  that  q  #A  p and  q  #A  p  +  1, the  antecedent 
of (18) holds  when x has value p +  1 and y has value q; by clause  (8), in this case z has 
to take the value  p. Hence  K(p, p +  1, q) is true in W. Moreover,  when  x has value  p 
and y has value  p +  1, then  the antecedent  of  (19) holds,  so  that  K(p,p  +  1,p  +  1) 
and K(p, p +  1, p) are true in W. Thus K(p, p +  1, q) is true in W for all integers  p and 
q. We may  conclude  that  the restriction  of  W to  {0, 1, 2,...  } is a model  for J.  D 
?4.  Conservativeness.  Although  the  reduction  just  given  of  the  V]V-class  to  the 
MGCI  does not preserve finite satisfiability,  it can be amended  so as to do so. In fact, 
given  an V]V-formula  J, we  may  alter  the  construction  of  ?3 thus:  we  introduce  a 
monadic  predicate  letter  W, along  with  new  clauses  that  allow  W to  be true of  an 
element  n iff  J  has  a  model  with  universe  {O,...,  n}; and  we  replace  the  clause 
Zx  A  Iy  -+  Szy  of the formulas  of  ?3 by Zx  A  Iy  A  - 
Wy  -+  Szy.  Thus,  if  W holds 
of  an  element  then  that  element  need  not  have  a  successor.  This  will  permit  the 
MGCI  formula  to have  a finite  model. 
In this section,  however,  we give a more intricate  proof  of conservativeness,  so as 
to facilitate  a further reduction-carried  out in ?5-to  the class  of MGCI  formulas 
that  contain  only  one  dyadic  predicate  letter.  The  MGCI  formulas  we  use  in this UNSOLVABILITY  OF  THE  GODEL  CLASS  WITH  IDENTITY  1245 
proof all contain the same ten dyadic letters, whose intended interpretations are 
fixed.  Nine of these letters were used in ?3,  namely, S, P1,  P2, L1, L2, N, Q, R1, and R2 . 
A new dyadic letter M is meant to hold between two elements of a model only if the 
first represents a pair <  p, q> and the second a pair <r,  p> for some p, q, and r. 
Another difference  between the formulas below and those of ?3 is this: the intended 
models for the formulas below contain three different  elements that represent each 
pair <p, q>; these elements will be identified with triples <  p, q, i> for i = 0, 1, 2. A 
monadic letter E will be true of such a triple iff i = 0. We also use monadic letters Z, 
I, D, B1, B2 as in ?3,  and a monadic letter W with the role indicated above. Moreover, 
for every dyadic predicate letter '  of the V3V-formula  being reduced, we use two 
monadic letters As and A*; given a model 9  for that formula, if c represents a pair 
<  p, q>, then As is to be true of c iff 93 #  Ipq and A* is to be true of c iff 93  1= Oqp. 
THEOREM  3. The minimal  G5del class with identity is conservative. 
PROOF.  Let  J =  Vx~uVyK(x,  u, y)  be  an  V]V-formula of  pure quantification 
theory all of whose atomic subformulas  have one of the forms Oxy, 'yx,  'uy,  Oyu, 
where '  is a dyadic predicate letter. The class of such formulas is conservative [22]. 
Hence it suffices  to find an MGCI formula GJ  that is satisfiable iff J is satisfiable, and 
that has a finite model iff J has a finite model. 
Let L be the set of predicate letters of J, and let K*(v, w) be obtained from K by 
replacing atomic subformulas Oxy, 'Pyx, Ouy and Oyu by Aqv, A  v, Aow and A  w, 
respectively. Let HJ  be 
(Nxy  -+ K*(x, y))  A  (MXY A  MYX  A (Ao  x  =A  y)). 
0eL 
Let H' be like the matrix of the formula G of ?3,  but for the following changes: clause 
(7) is replaced by the conjunction of 
(7a)  Zx  A Iy  A -I WY  -SZY, 
(7b) Zx  A WY  -P1ZX  A P2Zy A Ez, 
(7c) Zx  A  Iy -+  Nyz; 
clause (11) is replaced by 
(1 1) Nyx -P1YZ  A (n Wz -L1yZ)  A  (Wz -  B1x); 
and two new clauses are conjoined: 
(18) EX  A  EY A  iNXY  A  iNyx  -P1XZ  A (P2YZ  -*  MXY); 
(19) (Nxy  -*  (Ex -Ey))  A  (WX -+  -  ZX)  A  (Qxy -+  Ex)  A  (Ex -+  -  Ix). 
Finally, let GJ  be VxVy~z(H' A HJ). 
LEMMA  1. If J has a model then so does GJ. 
PROOF.  Let  V = N  x N  x  {0, 1, 2}, and let the universe be N u  V. Let 7r1, 7r2, 
and 7t3 be the projection functions on V. Interpret the predicate letters of H' so that, 
for 6 =  1,  2 and all a and b in the universe,  Za iff a = 0; Ia iff a e  N; Bba  iff a e  V and 
7,5a  = 0; Da iff ae  V and i1a  =  i2a;  Ea iff ae  V and 7r3a  = 0; Sab iff a,beN  and 
a =  b +  1; Pbab  iff a e  Vanditba =  b; Lbab  iff a e  V anditaa =  b +  1; Qab iff b e N, 
b > 0,  and  a =  <p,b-1,0>  for  some  p < b-1;  Nab  iff  a =  <p,q,i>  and 
b =  <p +  1,q,i>  for  some  integers  p,  q,  and  i;  R1ab  iff  a =  <p,q,i>  and 
b =  <q +  1,s,j>  for  some  integers  p,q,s  with  p < q  and  some  i  and j  with 
i =-j +  1 (mod 3); R2ab iff a =  <p,q,i> and b =  <s,q +  1,j> for some integers p,q,s 
with p < q and some i and j with i -j  +  1 (mod 3); and Mab iff a =  <p, q,  0> and 1246  WARREN D.  GOLDFARB 
b =  <s,p,O> for some integers p, q, and s. Moreover, interpret W to be true of no 
element. 
These interpretations provide a model for VxVy3zH'.  Indeed, a Skolem function qp 
for the existential variable z may be defined thus: 
0  if a=b  O, 
b +  1  if a =0  and beN, 
<Krrb +  1,2b,it3b>  if a = O and  b  E  V, 
a-i  if a,b  eN, a  O.  a  Oa  b, a A b +  1, 
a-1  if a +  0 and either P ba or P2ba, 
qpa b) =  12a  if Nab, 
7t1a  if Nba, Qba, Rba,  R2ba, or Ea A Eb A 
m  Nab A  7  Nba, 
<O,b,0>  if Sab, 
<0,b,i>  if Llab  or L2ab, where i _  3a +  1 (mod 3), 
<Tr1a  +  1,it2a,it3a>  if -iDa  and either Qab, Rab,  or R2ab, 
arbitrary  otherwise. 
Now  suppose J is satisfiable. Then it has a model 93 with universe N such that 
93 =  K(p, p +  1,  q) for all integers p and q. Say that an element a E V represents 
<p, q> iff ila  = p and it2a =  q. For each '  e L, interpret  the predicate letters A,, and 
A,  so that if a represents <p, q>, then A,,a iff 93  I  'pq  and A*a iff Q3  1= 'qp.  We 
show that these interpretations provide a model for VxVyHj.  Suppose Nab. Then, for 
some  p and  q, a  represents <p, q> and  b represents <p +  1,  q>. Hence  A,,a iff 
Q3  O  <pq, Aaa iff 93  - 'qp,  A0b iff 93  -  Pp +  1 q, and Apb iff 93  k  1q p +  1. Thus 
K*(a, b) is true. Now  suppose Mab A  Mba. Then, for some p and q, a represents 
<p, q> and b represents <q, p>. Hence Aa  iff A<b for each (  e L. 
Since G. is equivalent to VxVy~zH'  A VxVyHj the interpretations we have given 
provide a model for G. with universe N u  V  D 
LEMMA 2. If J has a finite model then so does GJ. 
PROOF. If J has a finite model then for some n >  0 it has a model  3 with universe 
{O,...,n}  such that 9k=  K(p,p  +  1,q) whenever p +  1,q < n and !k=  K(n,O,q) 
whenever q < n. (This elementary fact about V]V formulas is proved, for instance, in 
[3, p. 130].) We construct a model for GJ  with universe {o,..., n} U {O,...  ,n}  x 
{O,...  ,n}  x  {0,1,2}.  Let  the  interpretations  of  all  the  predicate letters  of  H' 
except N and W be the restrictions to this universe of the interpretations given in the 
proof of Lemma 1; let Wa iff a = n; and let Nab iff either Nab is true under the 
interpretation of Lemma 1 or else a =  <n,  q, i> and b =  <0,  q, i> for some q and i. 
Then VxVy~zH'  is true;  indeed, the Skolem function given in the proof of Lemma 1 
needs only to be restricted to arguments from the finite universe and altered at two 
points, namely, (p(a,  b) =  <0, b,  0> if a =  0 and b = n, and (p(a,  b) =  <0, 7m2b,  73b> if 
a =  0, b is a triple, and  7t1b =  n. 
Now define interpretations of the letters A,  and A  from the model 9  as in the 
proof of Lemma 1. The verification that these interpretations provide a model for 
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<n,  q> and b represents <0, q>. But since 9  #  K(n,  0, q), it follows as before that 
K*(a, b) is true. Thus we have defined a model for Gj whose universe is finite.  D 
Let (A)-(E) be the five conditions given in the proof of Lemma 3, ?3. 
LEMMA  3. Let St be any model  for Gj. Then either (I) W contains distinct elements 
0,1, 2, ...  such that (A)-(E) hold for each integer p, and also m  Wp for each p; or 
(II) for some n >  0, St contains distinct elements 0, 1,...  , n such that (A)-(E) hold 
for each p <  n, m  Wp for each p < n, and Wn. 
PROOF.  By clauses (1) and (6) there is a unique element 0 of  W such that ZO. 
Conditions (A)-(E) for p = 0 follow as in ?3. Note that m  WO,  by clause (19). Now 
suppose 0, . . , k are distinct elements of W such that (A)-(E) hold for each p < k and 
m  Wp for each p <  k. It suffices to show that if m  Wk then there exists an element 
k +  1 of W, distinct from 0,1,..  .,k,  such that (A)-(E) hold for p = k +  1. 
Sublemmas 1 and 2 as in ?3 can be proved as they were there. (The alteration in 
clause (11) made in this section does not affect the proof, since m  Wp  for each p <  k.) 
Moreover, on the assumption that m  Wk, by clause (7a) there exists a in 91  with Sak. 
An argument as in ?3 then establishes that there is a unique a in 91  with Sak;  let k +  1 
be  that  a.  Sublemmas 4-6,  which  complete  the  proof  that  (A)-(E)  hold  for 
p = k +  1, are also shown as before, with one extra step in the proof of Sublemma 6 
necessitated by the alteration in clause (7). We must show that if m  Ic then there 
exists b in 91  with P1  cb. But by clause (7c),  if m  Ic then there exists d in 91  with Ncd. By 
clause (11), then, there exists b in 91  with P1cb. 
LEMMA  4. If Gj  has a model then so does G; if Gj  has a finite model then so does G. 
PROOF.  Let 91 be a model for GJ,  with 91 finite if GJ  has a finite model. If (I) of 
Lemma 3 holds, let oc  =  wo;  if (II)  holds let oc  =  n +  1. Since (II) must hold if W is finite, 
it suffices  to construct a model 9  for J with universe {  p I  p < oc}.  Indeed, for p, q < oc 
let T(p, q) =  {b e W  I  P1bp  A  P2bq A  Eb}, and for each '  e L let  3 t  Ppq iff there 
exists c e T(p, q) such that Aqc. We shall show that 93  1=  J. 
SUBLEMMA  7. Let p, q <  o and b, c e W. 
(a) Suppose Nbc and b  T  F(p, q). If  p +  1 < oc  then c  T  F(p +  1,  q); if p +  1 = 
then c e T(o, q). 
(b) T(p, q) is nonempty. 
(c) If b e T(p, q) then, for each '  e L,  3 #  Oqp  iff  Azb. 
(d) If b e T(p, q) then, for each '  e L, 9  #  Ppq  iff Aob. 
PROOF.  (a) By (19), Eb _  Ec; hence Ec. By clause (10) there exists d in W with 
P2bd A  P2cd. By (D), d = q; hence P2cq. If  p +  1 <  oc,  then  Sublemma  1 yields 
P1cp +  1. If p +  1 =  oc,  then p =  n so that  Wp. By clause  (11) there exists  d in W with 
Pjbd  A  (We -+ B1c).  By (D), d =  p; hence B1c. By clause (2), P1cO. 
(b) We show first that T(o,  q)  is nonempty. If q +  1 <  oc,  then Seq for e = q +  1. By 
clause (12) there exists d in W with Qde A  P2dq A  B1d. By clauses (2) and (19), 
P1dO A  Ed;  hence d e T(o, q).  If q +  1 = o, then Wq;  by clause (7b) there exists d in W 
with P1dO  A  P2dq  A  Ed; hence d e T(o, q). Now  suppose F(r, q) is nonempty and 
r +  1 <  cx.  Let b e T(r, q). Since Eb, by clause (19) -  Ib; by clause (7c) there exists c 
in W with Nbc; by part (a), c e F(r +  1,  q). Thus F(r +  1, q) is nonempty. 
(c) Suppose  first that  b e T(p, q) and  c e F(q, p); we  show  that  Mbc A  Mcb. 
Suppose that Nbc. By part (a) and condition (D), q =  p and either p +  1 < cx  and 
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the latter case we have p = n = 0, which is also impossible. Thus m  Nbc. Similarly, 
m  Ncb. By clause (18), then, there exists d in  1 with Plbd A (P2cd  -+  Mbc). By (D), 
d = p; hence Mbc. Symmetric reasoning shows that Mcb. 
Now, by definition of 93  there exists c e F(q, p) with 93  F  'qp  iff A,,c. By what was 
just shown, Mcb A  Mbc. Thus VxVyHj  implies Aac =  Azb. Hence 93  I= 'qp  iff Aab. 
(d) If  A0b then  93 #  Ppq by definition. Suppose  9  #= Ppq,  and  let d be  any 
member of F(q, p). By part (c), Ad.  Moreover, as in (c), Mbd A  Mdb. Thus VxVyHj 
implies A,,b =Apd. Hence Apb.  D 
SUBLEMMA 8.  Let  p, q < a.  Then 9  k  K(p, p +  1,  q) whenever p +  1 < a,  and 
93  K(p,0,q)ifp+  1 =a. 
PROOF. Let  b E F(p,  q). Since  Eb, by  clause  (19)  m  lb. By clause  (7c)  there  exists  c in 
1 with Nbc. Thus VxVyHj  implies K*(b,  c). Let r = p +  1 if p +  1 < oc;  let r =  0 if 
p +  1 =  oc.  By Sublemma 7(a), c e F(r, q). By Sublemma 7(c) and (d), 9  t  'pq  iff 
A,pb,  9  #  lqp iff Azb, 9  k  'rq iff Aoc, and 9  I  'qr iff Apc. By the construction of 
K*(b,  c), it follows that 93  F  K(p, r, q).  D 
Sublemma 8 shows that 9  is a model for J.  Ii 
?5.  One dyadic letter. In this section we show how to reduce the formulas G. 
constructed in ?4 to MGCI formulas that contain only one dyadic predicate letter R. 
For this, we use new monadic letters Ci for i = 0, 1,  2, and CJ for i = 0, 1, 2 and 
j =  1,  2, 3. In the intended model, Ci holds of integers p such that p -i  (mod 3), and 
CJ  holds of triples b such that 1rjb  _  i (mod 3). Let  0=  1,A  1 = 2, and a2  = 0. For 
each dyadic letter  P  of GJ,  we define a formula IP*(v,  w) that contains just R and the 
new monadic letters. (In these definitions, the conjunctions A are for i =  0, 1,  2.) Let 
S*(v, w)  be  RVW  A IV A  IW, 
Pl*(v,w)  be  RVW  A A  (Civ  c 
P*(v,w)  be  RWV A A(Civ  Cw) 
L*(v,  w)  be  RVW  A A  (Civ = ciw 
L*(v, w)  be  RWV  A A  (Civ=C2iW) 
Q*(v,w)  be  RWVAA(CAGiv  C7w), 
R*(vw)  be  RVW  A A(caiv-0i 
R*(v,w)  be  RWV  A A (Caiv cN3 
N*(v,w)  be  RVW  A RWV  A A[(cv_  C3W) A  (CV_  CiW)  A  (CVC'iW)], 
M*(v,w)  be  Rvw A C3V A C3W  A  1 N*(v,W) A -  N*(w,v). 
Now let G* be obtained from GJ  by replacing, for every dyadic predicate letter  P 
and all variables v and w, each atomic subformula WPvw  by the formula WP*(v,  w). 
Since G* comes from GJ  by replacement of predicate letters, if it has a model then so 
does GJ,  so that J has a model; and if it has a finite model then so does GJ,  so that J 
has a finite model. Thus we need only show that if J has a model then so does G*, 
and if J has a finite model then so does G*. 
Suppose J  has  a model.  Then it  has  a model  9  with  universe N  such  that 
9  t  K(p, p +  1, q) for all integers p  and  q. Let  the  universe be N u  V, where 
V  N  x N  x  {0, 1,  2}. Interpret the predicate letters of  GJ  (including the dyadic UNSOLVABILITY  OF THE GODEL CLASS WITH IDENTITY  1249 
letters that do not occur in G*) as in the proof of Lemma 1, ?4; interpret the new 
monadic letters C' and CJ  as indicated at the start of this section, and interpret R so 
that, for all a and b in the universe, Rab iff 
(4)  Sab v  Plab v  P2ba v  Lab  v  L2ba v  Qba 
v  Nab v  Nba v  Rlab  v  R2ba v  Mab. 
It is easily checked that, for every dyadic letter IF of Gj  except M, and all a and b in 
the  universe,  P*(a,b)  is  true  iff  Pab is  true.  Moreover,  M*(a,b)  is  true  iff 
Mab A m  Nab A  -i Nba is true. Now  if the interpretations of  Lemma 1, ?4, are 
altered so that Mab now holds if  Mab A m  Nab  A  m  Nba held under the original 
interpretations, then the result is still a model for Gj, since m  Nxy  A  m  Nyx occurs 
in the antecedent of clause (18). It follows that the interpretation of R just given, 
along with the interpretations of the monadic letters, provides a model for G* with 
universe N u  V. 
Now suppose J has a finite model. Then it has a model 9  with universe {O,.  ..  .,  n} 
such that 93  S  K(p,p  +  1,q) whenever p +  1,q < n and 9  I= K(n,O,q) whenever 
q <  n. Without loss of  generality we may assume that n +  1=  0 (mod 3). For if 
n +  1 #  0  (mod 3) then  we  can  expand  9  to  a  suitable  model  with  universe 
{0,...,  3n + 2}  by  making  p indiscernible from q whenever p _  q (mod n +  1). 
We  now  show  that  GJ  has  a  model  with  universe  {O,..., n} u  ({O,...,  n} x 
{O  ... , n} x  {O,  1,  2}). Interpret the predicate letters of  Gj over this universe as in 
Lemma 2, ?4, interpret the monadic  letters Ci and  CJ as indicated above, and 
interpret  R so that Rab holds if  (:) of the proof immediately above holds. It follows 
that, for every dyadic predicate letter IF of GJ  save M and all elements a and b of 
the universe, IF*(a,  b) is true iff  TPab is true; and, moreover, M*(a, b) is true iff 
Mab A  -  Nab  A  -i Nba. From this and Lemma 2, ?4, we may conclude that these 
interpretations provide a finite model for GJ. 
Thus J has a model if  GJ has a model, and J has a finite model iff GJ has a finite 
model. This yields 
THEOREM  4. The class of formulas in the minimal  Godel class with identity whose 
nonlogical vocabulary  contains, aside from monadic  predicate letters,  just one dyadic 
predicate letter is conservative.  3l 
?6.  Prefix-similarity classes.  A  prefix-similarity class  is  a  class  of  prenex 
quantificational formulas specified by form of  quantifier prefix and number and 
degree of predicate letters.' If H denotes a prefix form and p and q are integers, then 
H(p, q) is the class of formulas with identity whose prefixes have form H and which 
contain at most p monadic predicate letters, q dyadic predicate letters, and no k-adic 
predicate letters for k 2  3; and H(oo, q) is the union of the classes H(p, q).  Note that, 
for any H, the class H(oo, 0) is subsumed by monadic quantification theory with 
identity, and hence is solvable. Moreover, if H is bounded (that is, contains at most r 
quantifiers for some r), then for all integers p and q the class H(p, q) contains only 
' For quantification theory extended by the inclusion of function symbols, the specification of prefix- 
similarity classes also includes the number and degree of such symbols. See [9] for an exhaustive list of 
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finitely many different formulas, up to alphabetic variants and truth-functionally 
equivalent matrices; hence H(p, q) is solvable. 
Theorem 4 of ?5 states that the class VV3(oo,  1) is conservative. Now  the class 
V3V(oc,  1) is also conservative [10].  From the positive results for prefix classes of 
quantification theory with identity given at the beginning of this paper, and from the 
remarks of  the  preceding  paragraph, it  follows  that  these  two  are  minimal 
unsolvable prefix-classes with bounded prefix form. 
Now  in pure quantification theory, the minimal undecidable prefix-similarity 
classes with bounded prefix form are VVV3(oo,  1) and V3V(ox,  1), and both of these 
are conservative ([20]  and  [10]).  Thus the dividing line between solvable  and 
unsolvable prefix-similarity  classes differs,  tracking the difference  in the dividing line 
between solvable and unsolvable prefix classes noted at the beginning of this paper. 
For pure quantification theory, the minimal unsolvable prefix-similarity classes 
with unbounded prefix form are the following: V...  V3(0,1) [14]; V3V ..  V(0,  1) [2]; 
V3 ... 3V(0, 1) [15]; 3 ...  3V3V(0,  1) [20]; 3 ...  3VWV3(0,  1) [20]; VVV3  ...  3(0, 1) [13]; 
and  V3V3  ...  3(0,1)  [8].  Moreover,  each  of  these  classes  is  conservative.  For 
quantification theory with identity, the last three classes can be collapsed into two; 
for, as we now show, it follows from Theorem 4 that the classes 3...  3VV3(0,  1) and 
VV3 *.. 3(0, 1) are conservative. Thus our results settle the decision problem for all 
prefix-similarity  classes of quantification theory with identity. 
THEOREM  5. The class 3 ...  3VV3(0,  1) is conservative. 
PROOF.  Let  F = VxVy3zH be  any  formula in  the  class  VV3(oo,  1); let  R  be 
the dyadic predicate letter of  F, and let P1,...  Pm be the monadic letters of  F. 
For  any  variable  v  let  D(v)  be  the  formula  A?<i<Mv  #  wt,  and  let  K = 
[D(z) A  (D(x) A D(y) -+ H')], where H' is obtained from H by replacing  each atomic 
subformula  Piv  with  Rvwi.  Finally,  let  G =  3w1  ...  3wmVxVy3zK. Thus  G E 
3 --  3VV3(0,  1). 
Suppose F has a model 9  with universe U. Let e1,..  , em  be distinct objects not in 
U. Let 9  be the structure with universe U u  {e1,.  .  , em} such that, for all a and b in 
this universe, 93  k  Rab iff either a, b e  U and 91 k  Rab or else a e  U, b =  ei, and 
91k  FPia. Clearly 9 3  VxVy3zK[ei,..  ., em]; hence 93 is a model for G. 
Now suppose G has a model 9  with universe V. Let e1, . . ., em  be elements of  V 
such that 93k VxVy3zK[el,...,em],  and let U =  V -  {e,,...,em}.  Since VxVy3zK 
implies 3zD(z), U is nonempty. Let 9  have universe U and, for a and b in U, let 
9  k=  Rab iff 93  k  Rab, and let 9  k=  Pia iff 93 k  Raei. Then 9  k=  F. 
Thus F has a model iff G has a model, and F has a finite model iff G has a finite 
model.  EL 
THEOREM 6. The class VV3  *  3(0, 1) is conservative. 
PROOF.  Let F be a formula in VV3(oo,  1) whose sole dyadic letter is R. Let F' be 
obtained from F by replacing each atomic subformula Rvw by Rvw v (v =  w  A  Pv), 
where P is a new monadic letter. Then F and Vx(-i Rxx)  A  F' are satisfiable over the 
same universes. For if Vx(i  Rxx)  A  F' is satisfiable over U then, since F' comes 
from F by replacement of a predicate letter, F is satisfiable over U. Conversely, any 
model for F can be transformed into one for Vx(-i Rxx)  A  F' by interpreting P as 
true of any element a such that 9  k  Raa and reinterpreting  R so that Rab is true iff 
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Suppose  that F' = VxVy3zH, and let P1,. .  ., Pm be the monadic predicate letters of 
F'.  Let  D(v)  be A1  <  i <m  v =A  wi, let H' be obtained from H by replacing each atomic 
subformula  Piv with Rvwi, and let K be the conjunction of the following clauses: 
(1)  D(z), 
(2)  Rw1w,  A  (Rxx  A  Ryy -*  x =  y), 
(3) A,  <i<m  m  [Rwiwi+ I  A  (Rwix  A  Rwiy -+x  =  y)], 
(4)  D(x)  A  D(y)  -H'. 
Finally,  let G be VxVy3z3w, ...  3wmK.  Thus G E VV3  ](0, 1). 
Suppose  that Vx(i  Rxx)  A  F' has a model 91 with universe U. Let el,...  ,em be 
distinct  objects  not in U. Let 9  have universe U u  {e,  .. ., em},  and, for all a and b in 
this  universe,  let  3 I= Rab iff either a, b E U and 91  F  Rab, or a = b = e1, or a = e 
andb=ei+1  forsomei,  1 < i<m,orae  U,b  =ei,and  91Pi=a.Notethatsince 
W  S  Vx(-iRxx), 93  t  Raa iff a =  e1; also, for 1 <  i <  m, 93  h  Reia iff a = ei+1. It 
follows  quickly that 93 = K[el,...,em],  so that 9  is a model for G. 
Now suppose that 9  is a model for G with universe V. By (2) there is a unique 
e, E V with 93  I  Ree1;  by (3) there are a unique e2 e  V with  3 I= Ree2,  a unique 
e3  e V  with 0  k  Re2  e3, ..., and a unique e.  e  V with93 I= Rem  - 1  em.  Moreover, the 
existential variables  w1,..  ., w.  must  always  take  values  e1, ..  ., em;  that  is, 
K8  VxVy3zK[el,...  ,e.].  Let  U  =  V -  e,,...,  em}.  By clause  (1), V is nonempty. 
Let 1  have  universe U, and for all a, b e  U let 91 = Rab iff 93  k  Rab and 9  I= Pia iff 
K5  F  Raei.  Then 91  F  Vx(i  Rxx), since el 0 V;  and, by clause (4) of G, W I= F'. 
Thus  F has a model iff G has a model, and F has a finite model if  G has a finite 
model. O 
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